


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27 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance  
SUBJECT: Downgrading of Photo Maps

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1. In response to an inquiry of State Department representative at the last meeting of COMOR, [redacted] has prepared the attached draft on the above subject.

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2. The Committee is requested to study this paper and be prepared to discuss it at the meeting on Friday, 30 June.

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JAMES O. REBER  
Chairman  
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance


Attachment  
Draft on subject paper.

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3--OSD  
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5--OACSI TCO  
6--ONI TCO  
7, 8, 9---AFCIN TCO  
10, 11---NSA TCO


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Downgrading of [redacted] Photo Maps

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1. Production of [redacted] photo maps through 25X1

joint participation of the Army Map Service and CIA has been undertaken as one means of using the results of the [redacted] reconnaissance 25X1 program to satisfy certain requirements of the intelligence community.


The photo maps will serve the following purposes:

a. To provide a working tool for intelligence analysts who are responsible for assessing the development of Sino-Soviet military and scientific programs and who are relying increasingly on intensive area analysis in arriving at judgments.

b. To provide all intelligence analysts with an infallible data base of priority information against which to check new material and from which to determine areal interrelationships.

c. To assist intelligence collectors by providing accurate maps on which to pinpoint targets to be collected by means other than satellite reconnaissance. In addition, the maps can prove valuable as guides toward the elimination of collection requirements already satisfied.

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d. To provide the military services with complete large-scale interim maps to cover planning needs until topographic maps can be compiled.

e. To improve the geodetic accuracy of existing map holdings. (Although the photo maps are primarily oriented toward presenting collated intelligence, the best available geodetic control data is used in their construction.)

f. To provide a systematic presentation of annotated [redacted] photography for use by NPIC in readout of future satellite reconnaissance missions.

g. To provide readily usable cartographic bases on which a variety of information may be overlayed for briefing purposes.

h. To support vantage point analysis for covert collection against special targets.

i. To assist war planners in determining strike routes and target selection. In this respect the Directorate of Intelligence, SAC, was requested to evaluate proofs of two maps and to suggest types of annotations not already incorporated. The suggestions made were accepted and will be adhered to throughout

j. To assist in determining operations areas and routes and in planning covert-limited and unconventional warfare.

2. Maps produced to date have been classified TOP SECRET

[redacted] and consequently must be given extremely limited distribution.

However, because of their potential contribution to the solution of numerous intelligence problems and to the filling of high priority detailed mapping requirements, the interests of the intelligence community could best be served by reducing their classification and control

to SECRET [redacted] as has 25X1

been done with products resulting from the U-2 program. As a result of reduced classification, non-[redacted]-cleared intelligence personnel who require maps as analytical aids will have access for the first time to the most accurate and comprehensive compilations available to the West. Multiple copies of downgraded maps could then be deposited in map libraries without taxing the limited [redacted] storage areas and eliminating a number of administrative burdens.

3. The remainder of this memorandum examines ways and means of achieving downgrading without jeopardizing [redacted] security and proposes a step-by-step approach to downgrading that will effect release over a period of time.

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Problems Encountered in DowngradingPhoto Maps

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4. It is recognized that downgrading of the photo maps cannot be carried out if doing so would reveal beyond plausible denial the photo base has resulted from satellite overflight reconnaissance of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. It is therefore necessary to examine the elements which conceivably could reveal the precise nature of the photo base. These elements are the technical characteristics of the photography, the extent of coverage, and the date of acquisition.

Technical Characteristics of the Photography


5. By the use of careful mosaic-laying techniques (which involve necessary rectification and alteration in scale in order to conform both to available geodetic control and to the format of the already constructed Army Map Service transverse mercator projection at 1:250,000 scale), cloud-free [redacted] photography can be used as a [redacted] photo base without knowledge of the true source being conveyed to persons now unaware of its existence. These techniques include dodging to eliminate tonal variations and cutting and fitting along hydrographic, topographic, or cultural lines. However, because of size and configuration, the presence of clouds on the photo base would be telltale evidence of extremely high altitude photography. Therefore, only maps free of

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
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clouds, those from which clouds and their shadows have been completely removed by photographic retouching and blending, or those revised by patching-in of subsequent cloud-free photography could be selected for downgrading.

Extent of Coverage

6. Intelligence personnel cleared to the SECRET [redacted]

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level are well aware of the fact that several overflight programs have collected photography over the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Some of this photography [redacted] was considered highly sensitive and was closely controlled as long as the operations were continuing but subsequently has been downgraded; other programs (Genetrix [redacted])

were classified SECRET or less from the outset. It is, therefore, recognized in the intelligence community and in other government operations and is not denied that the U. S. possesses classified overflight photography and that it is utilizing it in every possible way for intelligence purposes. The sole remaining security considerations are:

a. Extent of coverage, and

b. Date of acquisition (discussed in paragraph below).

Regarding the former, it is recognized that downgrading of photo maps should not be so extensive as to suggest to [redacted]

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personnel (who have not been indoctrinated) into the [redacted] program 25X1

that additional unique material is involved. (One result of downgrading

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of [redacted] photography has been to acquaint unwitting

personnel with the fact that considerable overflight activity about which

they knew little or nothing has been accomplished.) Consequently, as

a means of avoiding the disclosure of total coverage it is proposed to

restrict the downgrading of photo maps to those areas covered in large

part or contiguous to areas previously photographed. The accompanying

map shows the more important areas of existing non-[redacted] photog- 25X1

raphy on the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the 1:250,000 map areas considered

safe to downgrade provided they meet the cloud free provision discussed

above.

Date of Acquisition

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7. Non-[redacted] indoctrinated personnel are unaware 25X1

that Sino-Soviet Bloc reconnaissance [redacted]

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[redacted] has continued beyond 1 May 1960. This fact is a major

reason for the existence of the [redacted] security system and should 25X1

be protected against disclosure. However, because the photo maps are

constructed to relatively small scale format and because they are

heavily annotated from material drawn from all intelligence sources,

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the indoctrinated person would have considerable difficulty in determining whether the planimetric detail and the cultural features highlighted were derived from the base photography or from collateral source material. Maps already produced

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are annotated from source materials acquired since the photography was obtained. In any case, the date of photo base will either be omitted entirely or coded in a manner designed to be unintelligible to the non-cleared user. The standard procedure of showing the date of the most recent intelligence information will be substituted as the nominal date for downgrade maps. As a further precaution, highly critical cultural features known only in [redacted] circles will be covered with sanitized or censored intelligence sources before the map on which they appear is released.

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#### Summary of Proposed Downgrading Procedures

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8. Only photomaps which adhere to the following specifications will be downgraded to SECRET



a. Those free of clouds or those from which clouds and their shadows have been completely removed either by photographic retouching or by patching from subsequent cloud-free photography.

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b. Those made from mosaics prepared in such a way as to disguise the characteristics of the original photographic format

c. Those made from [redacted] photography duplicating coverage by other reconnaissance programs or adjacent to areas covered by the latter. (These areas are shown on the accompanying map.)

d. Those on which the date of the photographic base is obscured by the planimetric detail or by annotations from collateral sources either actual or fabricated. Photo date, if used at all, will be coded.


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


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15--DIRNPIC  
16--TSO CIA  
17--OPS OFF/NPIC  
18--C/DMD/NPIC  
19--DDP TCO  
20--Intel Staff/DPD  
21--SO/DPD  
22-27--C/SRS/DPD/DDP



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